What are the implications of climate for state-society relations? Economic, physiological, and social pressures brought about by climate change can provide new opportunities for citizens to learn about: the loyalty of political leaders; the security capacity of the state; and their ability to rely on members of their own community. Thus successful political mobilization is likely in the wake of climate change. We develop a model of collective action in the presence of climate shocks and show that uncertainty about causal attribution can lead citizens to rationally under-estimate environmental impacts, attributing observed outcomes instead to features of their political environment. We provide evidence for our claims using geocoded weather data and a unique household-level panel survey from India. Unusually high temperatures reduce trust in leaders and security forces while increasing intra-community cooperation. High temperatures also increase voter turnout, rates of anti-incumbent voting, and the frequency of non-violent anti-government protest.

International competition has led to the increasing adoption of labor-replacing technology. What are the consequences of this development for international integration? I posit that robots can make workers more productive, increasing the opportunity cost of rent-seeking behavior via union activities. Consequently, the political influence of unions falls in response to robot adoption, with important implications for domestic and international politics and policy. Using data from the U.S. (2004-2014) and leveraging quasi-exogenous variation in international competition in the exposure to robots at the congressional district level, I show that an increase in robot adoption reduces substantively the likelihood that congresspeople vote with unions' interests---especially regarding policy that compensates the losers from international competition. This effect is larger in areas with larger shares of skilled workers, lending support to the hypothesized opportunity-cost mechanism. Reductions in union activities, political contributions, and lower support for cosmopolitanism and for taxation explain this finding.

Scholars have established a connection between automation and the backlash against globalization, however these investigations have focused mostly on the role of robot adoption. We develop a model of redistributive conflict wherein automation is deskilling, substituting medium-skilled workers. We demonstrate that deskilling can increase the level of distributive conflict between workers and firms, as well as affect workers' preferences for redistribution. To assess this, we exploit a major event-shock: the advent of ChatGPT. We also collect data on a wide variety of opinion survey data sets to estimate the impact of the release of ChatGPT on people’s attitudes towards redistribution, and data on collective bargaining and strikes to evalaute the impact of ChatGPT on distributive conflict. We find that the the releases of these AI technologies have stronger impacts on the attitudes of medium-skilled labor, increasing their support for redistribution but showcasing higher in-group behavior. We also show that medium-skilled labor is more likely to support increasing rent-seeking activities at the workplace, through higher support for unionization, and that union activities increase even though bargaining power decreases. We perform numerous placebo tests and robustness tests to show that it is the advent of these technologies and no other events, what explains our findings.

The combination of populism and protectionism emerged primarily from social class cleavages during the 20th century, to protect those affected by international economic competition. In the 21st century these cleavages have also involved an ethnic dimension, which regards the ethnic majority as the citizens deserving protection even though ethnic minorities are affected by international competition. What does explain this puzzle? I posit that this protectionist populism is especially likely to emerge when populists shape voters’ preferences over protectionism using elite cues. Cues generate voter polarization by activating voters’ social identities, and this benefits populists. Populists may not use cues on ethnic minorities when their support isn't essential because doing so isn't cost-effective. Counterintuitively, populists use cues when there’s little voter polarization ex-ante. I also find that higher international competition is generally insufficient to generate demands for protectionist populism in the absence of elite cues. My findings also provide various empirical implications.

The connection between import competition, economic nationalism and the rise of political extremism has been well-established, but little is known about the mechanisms that drive it. I argue that labor unions are essential institutions that protect society from these outcomes. I posit that strong labor unions increase the cost of using populist-style politics for politicians. I provide evidence for my claims using data from the U.S. (2002-2016) and a shift-share that leverages quasi-exogenous variation in import competition, at the congressional district level. I find that where unions weakened the most pre-treatment, import competition leads to an increase in the use of populist rhetoric, a negative effect on voters' attitudes towards cosmopolitanism, and an increase in voters' support for economic nationalism.I develop a method to estimate the moderating effect of unions, even under potential bundling. A reduction in legislator's support for unions' interests in policy making and structural economic change toward services, explain my findings.

Do tariff revenues affect democratization? We argue that tariff revenues have two effects: i) A rapacity effect because the fiscal windfalls generate incentives for controlling government, and ii) A redistributive effect because tariffs impact the returns to the factors of production, changing the distribution of power between groups. If ruling elites benefit from redistribution, this discourages challenging them. If elites lose from redistribution, they may share power to avoid expropriation. We test these claims during the First Wave of Globalization, when ruling elites were often landed. We find evidence that tariff revenues reduce democratization in land-abundant economies because ruling elites strengthen via the redistributive effect, as the return to land increases, and both controlling tariffs and its windfalls bolster the rapacity effect. In capital-abundant economies the return to land falls, thus the redistributive effect offsets the rapacity effect. Congruently, we find a positive but statistically-insignificant effect for tariff revenues.

We exploit time and spatial variation generated by the commodities boom to measure the effect of natural resources on human capital formation in Peru, a country with low governance indicators. Combining test scores from over two million students and district-level administrative data of mining taxes redistributed to local governments, we find sizable effects on student learning from the redistribution. However, and consistent with recent political economy models, the relationship is non-monotonic. Based on these models, we identify improvements in school expenditure and infrastructure, together with increases in health outcomes of adults and children, as key mechanisms explaining the effect we find for redistribution. Policy implications for the avoidance of the natural resource curse are discussed.

I address the link between democracy and inequality in Latin America, analyzing whether the degree of democracy that birth cohorts experience during the course of their formative years is related to labor income dispersion later, in adulthood. For this, I measure inequality at the cohort level by using pseudo-panel data built from household surveys for fifteen Latin American countries (from circa 1995 to circa 2011) and measure democracy as the discounted cumulative value of the degree of democracy during the cohort’s formative years. I find that cohorts that have higher discounted cumulative values of the degree of democracy show lower income inequality. However, the effect of democracy on income dispersion is driven by those cohorts that benefited from the surge of democracies that came to exist during the second half of the twentieth century. I also present suggestive evidence that education is one mechanism explaining these results.

This essay seeks to provide practical guidance for applied quantitative IR researchers regarding the steps of the research process in between theory development and statistical analysis. That is, given a clearly articulated theoretical prediction, what must be done before the researcher can run a regression? This chapter primarily addresses decisions pertaining to the selection of a sample of analysis, and the selection of variables to operationalize theoretical quantities of interests, with a focus on the implications of these decisions for internal and external validity and statistical power.