

International Political Economy: Core

FALL 2020

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Course Description:

This is a graduate-level introduction to the field of International Political Economy. We review new research and seminal papers on the interaction between politics and economics in issue areas of trade, migration, international finance and international organizations. The objective is to understand how domestic and international actors shape both foreign economic policies and the collective policy choices of international organizations. Then, on the basis of these inputs, our goal is to build and test theory that help us understanding observable cross-border flows of goods, capital and labor, foreign aid and the domestic implications of these phenomena.

The course will survey four main substantive domains of the international economy: First, the political economy of international trade policies. Second, migration regulations and labor standards. Third, currently relevant issues and puzzles in the politics of international finance. Finally, we study the role of major international organizations (IMF, WTO and World Bank) and how special interests shape them.

Time and location: Monday 2pm - 3:50pm, room 212, 19 West 4th St.

Office hours: By appointment.

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Requirements:

- **Attendance and Participation (15%):** I expect you to attend class each week prepared to contribute to the seminar. The minimum I expect from you is to read all mandatory readings

(see below for instructions).

- **Referee Reports (15%):** You will write 2 referee reports on two of the articles we read for class over the course of the semester (you choose which two). These will be 2-3 pages in length and written as though you were reviewing a manuscript for an academic journal.
- **Presentations (20%):** You will serve as a discussant 2 or 3 times over the course of the semester. This will involve making slides and giving a 5-minute presentation on two of the papers assigned for that week.
- **Final Paper (50%):** You can choose one of the following options: 1. A full length journal article (25 pages max.), 2. A shorter article in the style of a letter or research note (5-10 pages), or 3. An NSF style research grant proposal. Your final project will depend on the stage of your research and what would be most useful for you. Research ideas must be discussed with the instructor before the fall recess.

Textbooks:

The course does not follow any particular textbook. Nevertheless, the following textbooks are recommended for reference throughout the course and beyond:

Frieden, J. A. and Lake, D. A. (2017). *International political economy: perspectives on global power and wealth*. Routledge.

Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., and Van Marrewijk, C. (2009). *The new introduction to geographical economics*. Cambridge University Press.

Gandolfo, G. (2013). *International economics*. Springer.

Feenstra, R. C. (2015). *Advanced international trade: theory and evidence*. Princeton university press.

I. The political economy of trade

Week I. Introduction: international trade theory

Feenstra, R. C. (2015). *Advanced international trade: theory and evidence*. Princeton university press. Chapters 1-5.

Frieden, J. A. and Lake, D. A. (2017). *International political economy: perspectives on global power and wealth*. Routledge. Chapters 1, 2, 19 and 21.

Optional readings:

Rogowski, R. (1987). Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. *American Political Science Review*, 81(4):1121–1137.

Bailey, M. A., Goldstein, J., and Weingast, B. R. (1997). The institutional roots of american trade policy: Politics, coalitions, and international trade. *World Politics*, 49(3):309–338.

Hiscox, M. J. (2001). Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade. *International Organization*, 55(1):1–46.

Scheve, K. F. and Slaughter, M. J. (2001b). What determines individual trade-policy preferences? *Journal of International Economics*, 54(2):267–292.

Hiscox, M. J. (2002). Commerce, coalitions, and factor mobility: Evidence from congressional votes on trade legislation. *American Political Science Review*, 96(3):593–608

Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity. *econometrica*, 71(6):1695–1725.

Week II. Trade and domestic politics: class, industry and trade policy

Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for sale. *The American Economic Review*, pages 833–850.

Baker, A. (2005). Who wants to globalize? consumer tastes and labor markets in a theory of trade policy beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4):924–938.

Mansfield, E. D. and Mutz, D. C. (2009). Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(3):425–457.

Margalit, Y. (2011). Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in us elections. *American Political Science Review*, 105(1):166–188.

Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., Majlesi, K., et al. (2016). Importing political polarization? the electoral consequences of rising trade exposure.

Rho, S. and Tomz, M. (2017). Why don't trade preferences reflect economic self-interest? *International Organization*, 71(S1):S85–S108.

Colantone, I. and Stanig, P. (2018). Global competition and brexit. *American political science review*, 112(2):201–218.

Optional readings:

Milner, H. V. and Kubota, K. (2005). Why the move to free trade? democracy and trade policy in the developing countries. *International organization*, 59(1):107–143.

Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M. J. (2006). Learning to love globalization: Education and indi-

vidual attitudes toward international trade. *International Organization*, 60(2):469–498.

Hanson, G. H., Scheve, K., and Slaughter, M. J. (2007). Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies. *Economics & Politics*, 19(1):1–33.

David, H., Dorn, D., and Hanson, G. H. (2013). The china syndrome: Local labor market effects of import competition in the united states. *American Economic Review*, 103(6):2121–68.

Rickard, S. J. (2015). Electoral systems and trade. *The Oxford handbook of the political economy of international trade*, 15(0):280.

Aklin, M., Arias, E., Deniz, E., and Peter Rosendorff, B. (2015). Domestic politics of trade policy. *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*, pages 1–14.

Walter, S. (2017). Globalization and the demand-side of politics: How globalization shapes labor market risk perceptions and policy preferences. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5(1):55–80.

Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2018). Identity politics and trade policy. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Margalit, Y. (2019). Political responses to economic shocks. *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Week III. New “new” trade theory and politics

Bombardini, M. and Trebbi, F. (2012). Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy? *Journal of International Economics*, 87(1):18–26.

Kim, I. S. (2017). Political cleavages within industry: firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):1–20.

Osgood, I., Tingley, D., Bernauer, T., Kim, I. S., Milner, H. V., and Spilker, G. (2017). The charmed life of superstar exporters: Survey evidence on firms and trade policy. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):133–152.

Osgood, I. (2017). The breakdown of industrial opposition to trade: firms, product variety, and reciprocal liberalization. *World Politics*, 69(1):184–231.

Baccini, L., Pinto, P. M., and Weymouth, S. (2017). The distributional consequences of preferential trade liberalization: firm-level evidence. *International Organization*, 71(2):373–395.

Baccini, L., Dür, A., and Elsig, M. (2018). Intra-industry trade, global value chains, and preferential tariff liberalization. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(2):329–340.

Optional readings:

Dür, A., Baccini, L., and Elsig, M. (2014). The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset. *The Review of International Organizations*, 9(3):353–375.

Goldstein, J. and Gulotty, R. (2014). America and trade liberalization: the limits of institutional reform. *International Organization*, 68(2):263–295.

Madeira, M. A. (2016). New trade, new politics: intra-industry trade and domestic political coalitions. *Review of International Political Economy*, 23(4):677–711.

Kim, I. S. and Osgood, I. (2019). Firms in trade and trade politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22:399–417.

Week IV. Supply chains

Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., and Sturgeon, T. (2005). The governance of global value chains. *Review of international political economy*, 12(1):78–104.

Mansfield, E. D. and Mutz, D. C. (2013). Us versus them: Mass attitudes toward offshore outsourcing. *World Politics*, 65(4):571–608.

Jensen, J. B., Quinn, D. P., and Weymouth, S. (2015). The influence of firm global supply chains and foreign currency undervaluations on us trade disputes. *International Organization*, 69(4):913–947.

Johns, L. and Wellhausen, R. L. (2016). Under one roof: Supply chains and the protection of foreign investment. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):31–51.

Malesky, E. J. and Mosley, L. (2018). Chains of love? global production and the firm-level diffusion of labor standards. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3):712–728.

Osgood, I. (2018). Globalizing the supply chain: Firm and industrial support for us trade agreements. *International Organization*, 72(2):455–484.

Optional readings:

Antras, P. and Helpman, E. (2004). Global sourcing. *Journal of political Economy*, 112(3):552–580

Distelhorst, G. and Locke, R. M. (2018). Does compliance pay? social standards and firm-level trade. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3):695–711.

Park, J. H. and Kim, B. K. (2020). Why your neighbor matters: Positions in preferential trade agreement networks and export growth in global value chains. *Economics & Politics*.

Ahlquist, J. S. and Mosley, L. (2020). Firm participation in voluntary regulatory initiatives: The accord, alliance, and us garment importers from bangladesh. *The Review of International Or-*

ganizations, pages 1–27.

Week V. Trade and state capacity

Baunsgaard, T. and Keen, M. (2010). Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(9-10):563–577.

Rodrik, D. (2011). *The globalization paradox: democracy and the future of the world economy*. WW Norton & Company

Queralt, D. et al. (2015). From mercantilism to free trade: A history of fiscal capacity building. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 10(2):221–273.

Queralt, D. (2017). Protection not for sale, but for tax compliance. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(3):631–641.

Bastiaens, I. and Rudra, N. (2018). *Democracies in Peril*. Cambridge University Press.

Optional readings:

Mosley, L. (2003). *Global capital and national governments*. Cambridge University Press.

Wolf, N. and Huning, T. (2019). How Britain unified Germany: Endogenous trade costs and the formation of a customs union. *CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13634*.

II. Migration

Week VI. Human capital mobility and Politics

Zhang, W.-B. (2008). International trade theory. *Capital, knowledge, economic structure, money*. Chapter 4.

Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., and Van Marrewijk, C. (2009). *The new introduction to geographical economics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3 and 4.

Cahuc, P., Carcillo, S., and Zylberberg, A. (2014). *Labor economics*. MIT press. Chapter 11.

Bodvarsson, Ö. B., Simpson, N. B., and Sparber, C. (2015). Migration theory. In *Handbook of the economics of international migration*, volume 1, pages 3–51. Elsevier.

Optional readings:

Scheve, K. F. and Slaughter, M. J. (2001a). Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 83(1):133–145.

Hanson, G. H., Scheve, K., and Slaughter, M. J. (2007). Public finance and individual prefer-

ences over globalization strategies. *Economics & Politics*, 19(1):1–33.

Razin, A., Sadka, E., and Swagel, P. (2002). Tax burden and migration: a political economy theory and evidence. *Journal of Public Economics*, 85(2):167–190.

Hatton, T. J. and Williamson, J. G. (2005). A dual policy paradox: Why have trade and immigration policies always differed in labor-scarce economies. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Lee, W. and Roemer, J. E. (2006). Racism and redistribution in the united states: A solution to the problem of american exceptionalism. *Journal of public Economics*, 90(6-7):1027–1052.

Bodvarsson, Ö. B., Van den Berg, H., et al. (2013). *The economics of immigration*. Springer.

Week VII. The political economy of migration

Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M., and Mishra, P. (2011). Do interest groups affect us immigration policy? *Journal of International Economics*, 85(1):114–128.

Dancygier, R. M. and Donnelly, M. J. (2013). Sectoral economies, economic contexts, and attitudes toward immigration. *The journal of politics*, 75(1):17–35.

Fitzgerald, J., Leblang, D., and Teets, J. C. (2014). Defying the law of gravity: The political economy of international migration. *World Politics*, 66(3):406–445.

Peters, M. E. (2014). Open trade, closed borders immigration policy in the era of globalization. *World Politics*.

Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. J., and Margalit, Y. (2015). Do concerns about labor market competition shape attitudes toward immigration? new evidence. *Journal of International Economics*, 97(1):193–207.

Bearce, D. H. and Hart, A. F. (2017). International labor mobility and the variety of democratic political institutions. *International Organization*, 71(1):65–95.

Optional readings:

Mayda, A. M. (2006). Who is against immigration? a cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants. *The review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(3):510–530.

Singer, D. A. (2010). Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world. *American Political Science Review*, 104(2):307–323.

Leblang, D. (2010). Familiarity breeds investment: Diaspora networks and international investment. *American political science review*, 104(3):584–600.

Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M. J. (2010). Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment. *American political science review*, 104(1):61–

84.

Mosley, L. and Singer, D. A. (2015). Migration, labor, and the international political economy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18:283–301.

Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., and Pietrantuono, G. (2017). Catalyst or crown: Does naturalization promote the long-term social integration of immigrants? *American Political Science Review*, 111(2):256–276.

Tsourapas, G. (2018). Labor migrants as political leverage: migration interdependence and coercion in the mediterranean. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(2):383–395.

Week VIII. Recess

III. International finance

Week IX. Monetary policy

Mukherjee, B. and Singer, D. A. (2008). Monetary institutions, partisanship, and inflation targeting. *International Organization*, 62(2):323–358.

Broz, J. L. and Plouffe, M. (2010). The effectiveness of monetary policy anchors: Firm-level evidence. *International Organization*, 64(4):695–717.

Bodea, C. (2010). Exchange rate regimes and independent central banks: a correlated choice of imperfectly credible institutions. *International Organization*, 64(3):411–442.

Steinberg, D. A. and Malhotra, K. (2014). The effect of authoritarian regime type on exchange rate policy. *World Politics*, 66(3):491–529.

Broz, J. L. and Werfel, S. H. (2014). Exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection. *International Organization*, 68(2):393–416.

Bodea, C. and Hicks, R. (2015). Price stability and central bank independence: Discipline, credibility, and democratic institutions. *International Organization*, 69(1):35–61.

Optional readings:

Broz, J. L. (1999). Origins of the federal reserve system: International incentives and the domestic free-rider problem. *International Organization*, 53(1):39–70.

Mosley, L. (2000). Room to move: International financial markets and national welfare states. *International organization*, 54(4):737–773.

Broz, J. L. (2002). Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes. *International Organization*, 56(4):861–887.

Keefer, P. and Stasavage, D. (2003). The limits of delegation: Veto players, central bank inde-

pendence, and the credibility of monetary policy. *American political science review*, 97(3):407–423.

Leblang, D. and Satyanath, S. (2006). Institutions, expectations, and currency crises. *International Organization*, 60(1):245–262.

Walter, S. (2008). A new approach for determining exchange-rate level preferences. *International Organization*, 62(3):405–438.

Bearce, D. H. and Hallerberg, M. (2011). Democracy and de facto exchange rate regimes. *Economics & Politics*, 23(2):172–194.

Copelovitch, M. S. and Pevehouse, J. C. (2013). Ties that bind? preferential trade agreements and exchange rate policy choice. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2):385–399.

Week X. Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties

Pinto, P. M. and Pinto, S. M. (2008). The politics of investment partisanship: And the sectoral allocation of foreign direct investment. *Economics & Politics*, 20(2):216–254.

Büthe, T. and Milner, H. V. (2008). The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: increasing fdi through international trade agreements? *American journal of political science*, 52(4):741–762.

Pandya, S. S. (2010). Labor markets and the demand for foreign direct investment. *International Organization*, 64(3):389–409.

Jandhyala, S., Henisz, W. J., and Mansfield, E. D. (2011). Three waves of bits: The global diffusion of foreign investment policy. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(6):1047–1073.

Arias, E., Hollyer, J. R., and Rosendorff, B. P. (2018). Cooperative autocracies: Leader survival, creditworthiness, and bilateral investment treaties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):905–921.

Li, Q., Owen, E., and Mitchell, A. (2018). Why do democracies attract more or less foreign direct investment? a metaregression analysis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(3):494–504.

Optional readings:

Kobrin, S. J. (1987). Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing countries. *International organization*, 41(4):609–638.

Elkins, Z., Guzman, A. T., and Simmons, B. A. (2006). Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000. *International organization*, 60(4):811–846.

Hollyer, J. R. and Rosendorff, B. P. (2012). Leadership survival, regime type, policy uncertainty

and pta accession. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(4):748–764.

Kerner, A. (2014). What we talk about when we talk about foreign direct investment. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(4):804–815.

Pandya, S. S. (2014). *Trading spaces*. Cambridge University Press.

Week XI. Sovereign debt and debt crises

Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., and Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). The economics and law of sovereign debt and default. *Journal of economic literature*, 47(3):651–98.

Beaulieu, E., Cox, G. W., and Saiegh, S. (2012). Sovereign debt and regime type: Reconsidering the democratic advantage. *International Organization*, 66(4):709–738.

Brooks, S. M., Cunha, R., and Mosley, L. (2015). Categories, creditworthiness, and contagion: how investors' shortcuts affect sovereign debt markets. *International studies quarterly*, 59(3):587–601.

Kaplan, S. B. and Thomsson, K. (2017). The political economy of sovereign debt: global finance and electoral cycles. *The journal of politics*, 79(2):605–623.

Bodea, C. and Hicks, R. (2018). Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions? *Economics and Politics*, 30(3):340–365.

Queralt, D. (2019). War, international finance, and fiscal capacity in the long run. *International Organization*, 73(4):713–753.

Optional readings:

Schultz, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (2003). The democratic advantage: institutional foundations of financial power in international competition. *International Organization*, 57(1):3–42.

Simmons, B. A. and Elkins, Z. (2004). The globalization of liberalization: Policy diffusion in the international political economy. *American political science review*, 98(1):171–189.

Lipsy, P. Y. (2011). Democracy and financial crisis. In *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*.

Copelovitch, M. and Singer, D. A. (2017). Tipping the (im) balance: Capital inflows, financial market structure, and banking crises. *Economics & Politics*, 29(3):179–208.

IV. International Organizations

Week XII. World Trade Organization

Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R. W. (1999). An economic theory of gatt. *American Economic Review*, 89(1):215–248.

Rosendorff, B. P. and Milner, H. V. (2001). The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. *International Organization*, 55(4):829–857.

Davis, C. L. (2004). International institutions and issue linkage: Building support for agricultural trade liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 98(1):153–169.

Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability and rigidity: politics and design of the wto's dispute settlement procedure. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):389–400.

Kucik, J. and Pelc, K. J. (2016). Measuring the cost of privacy: a look at the distributional effects of private bargaining. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(4):861–889.

Arias, E. (2020). Impartiality in international courts: Evidence from a natural experiment at the wto. Mimeo, College of William and Mary.

Optional readings:

Krasner, S. D. (1976). State power and the structure of international trade. *World Politics*, 28(3):317–347.

Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1995). Trade wars and trade talks. *Journal of political Economy*, 103(4):675–708.

Busch, M. L. (2000). Democracy, consultation, and the paneling of disputes under gatt. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(4):425–446.

Steinberg, R. H. (2002). In the shadow of law or power? consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the gatt/wto. *International organization*, 56(2):339–374.

Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., and Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements. *International Organization*, 56(3):477–513.

Goldstein, J. L., Rivers, D., and Tomz, M. (2007). Institutions in international relations: Understanding the effects of the gatt and the wto on world trade. *International Organization*, 61(1):37–67.

Week XIII. International Monetary Fund

Broz, J. L. and Hawes, M. B. (2006). Congressional politics of financing the international monetary fund. *International Organization*, 60(2):367–399.

Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., and Vreeland, J. R. (2009b). Global horse trading: Imf loans for votes

in the united nations security council. *European Economic Review*, 53(7):742–757.

Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or servant? common agency and the political economy of imf lending. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(1):49–77.

Caraway, T. L., Rickard, S. J., and Anner, M. S. (2012). International negotiations and domestic politics: The case of imf labor market conditionality. *International organization*, 66(1):27–61.

Rickard, S. J. and Caraway, T. L. (2014). International negotiations in the shadow of national elections. *International Organization*, 68(3):701–720.

Nelson, S. C. (2014). Playing favorites: how shared beliefs shape the imf’s lending decisions. *International Organization*, 68(2):297–328.

Optional readings:

Frieden, J. A. and Lake, D. A. (2017). *International political economy: perspectives on global power and wealth*. Routledge. Chapters 14-16.

Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of imf lending in africa. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4):577–591.

Chwieroth, J. M. (2008). Normative change from within: The international monetary fund’s approach to capital account liberalization. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(1):129–158.

Frieden, J. and Broz, J. L. (2012). The political economy of international monetary policy coordination. *The Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization*, Gerard Caprio, ed., Elsevier Publishing Inc.

Week XIV. Foreign aid and development agencies

Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., and Vreeland, J. R. (2009a). Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the un security council influence world bank decisions? *Journal of Development Economics*, 88(1):1–18.

Easterly, W. (2014). *The tyranny of experts: Economists, dictators, and the forgotten rights of the poor*. Basic Books. Chapters 1 and 6-8.

De Mesquita, B. B. and Smith, A. (2010). Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance. *American journal of political science*, 54(4):936–950.

Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2011). *Pillars of prosperity: The political economics of development clusters*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 6.

Carnegie, A. and Marinov, N. (2017). Foreign aid, human rights, and democracy promotion: Evidence from a natural experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3):671–683.

Carnegie, A. and Samii, C. (2019). International institutions and political liberalization: Evi-

dence from the world bank loans program. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(4):1357–1379.

Optional readings:

Frieden, J. A. and Lake, D. A. (2017). *International political economy: perspectives on global power and wealth*. Routledge. Chapters 26-28.

Ahmed, F. Z. (2012). The perils of unearned foreign income: Aid, remittances, and government survival. *American Political Science Review*, 106(1):146–165.

Bermeo, S. B. and Leblang, D. (2015). Migration and foreign aid. *International Organization*, 69(3):627–657.

Honig, D. (2019). When reporting undermines performance: The costs of politically constrained organizational autonomy in foreign aid implementation. *International Organization*, 73(1):171–201.

To take home (optional): A general overview on international organizations

Fang, S. and Stone, R. W. (2012). International organizations as policy advisors. *International organization*, 66(4):537–569.

Carnegie, A. (2014). States held hostage: Political hold-up problems and the effects of international institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 108(1):54–70.

Lall, R. (2017). Beyond institutional design: Explaining the performance of international organizations. *International Organization*, 71(2):245–280.

Bearce, D. H. and Cook, T. R. (2018). The first image reversed: Igo signals and mass political attitudes. *The Review of International Organizations*, 13(4):595–619.

Abbott, K. W., Green, J. F., and Keohane, R. O. (2016). Organizational ecology and institutional change in global governance. *International Organization*, 70(2):247–277.